My research focuses on how the law structures economnic competition in modern markets. In particular, I'm interested in how complexity economics can provide a new view on markets which can help inform government interventions in market structure.
I'm part of a project which aims to examine the relationship between state aid to industry through investment incentives and the growing levels of market concentration in the United States and the European Union. The project is funded by the Economic Security Project.
I build an agent-based model to simulate how marketization changes the dynamics of monetized markets. I am able to recover stylized facts about the nature of such markets in the status quo, and model the effect of marketization should it be applied as a competition remedy.
This paper outlines why monetized (zero-priced) markets often tip towards a single dominant firm, and outlines a novel regulatory remedy by which such market failures can be prevented. This paper features in the 2021 conference for the Academic Society of Competition Law.
Winner of the Concurrences 2020 Best Student Paper award. This paper is essentially an earlier version of the paper above, and describes a structural approach to understanding market power online.